6. On war- What makes an effective soldier in a state of War? (Micro-aspect)

This post is a refinement of the previous posting. I shall explore the question of "What makes an effective soldier in a state of war?" from the micro-aspect's two paradigms: the mental faculties and physical capabilities of the soldier. Before we carry forth, what is an "Effective" soldier? I understand effectiveness to mean that the soldier can carry out what is required of him/her in a real warring situation. And the micro-aspect will be understood as all the faculties and capacities of the individual soldier. Of course some of the assumptions of a micro-aspect below has to remain as a purely theoretical delimitation of boundaries.

We shall first concentrate on the mental faculties of the effective soldier. The first micro-condition that exists in this paradigm is initiative. This translates into a flexibility in tactics which allows the soldier to adapt, counter and exploit. This is very important because the uncertainty of war is ever certain. So initiative helps pierce through the "fog of war" and foster a higher chance of success despite very real uncertainties. But as argued in my earlier post, initiative as a offspring of individualism must still be subsumed as part of a strategic hold (collectivism) lest it becomes unorganized and threatens tactical coherency.

Volunteerism is the second micro-condition in the paradigm of mental faculties that I shall delve into. Volunteerism aids in the effectiveness of a soldier in three important areas. Firstly, a unit of volunteers has the confidence of dedication from the company of comrades because he/she knows that every boot on the ground next to him/her signed up for this. Second, a crucial psychological acceptance of one's lot also means that such soldiers can be pushed to greater limits in training or real situations. This undoubtedly translates into greater effectiveness. One can fall back upon one's conviction to have chosen to be there in times of ordeal to draw strength. Thirdly, all these gets spilled over into a positive sense of warriors' vanity. He/she is most likely to push himself/herself to perform so as to be accepted as worthy in the eyes of his/her fellow gritty-minded comrades. Attempts at one-up-manship will also ensue which would also lead to the volunteer soldier pushing his limits to perform.

Thirdly, every soldier needs a cause. And the most primordial and effective of causes is a personal stake. The most effective form is of course the cause of protection of personal kin and property. Thus most wars, even offensive ones, are masked with a defensive necessity. A soldier fighting to defend all that is all to him will more likely fight to the end since it is matter of survival. This is opposed to a raider or looter who fights only when it beneficial and flees to gain another day. The ardent (which is grounded in desperation and a closed situation) defender has to make every day of his count so as to defend all that is dear to him. In the most hard-hitting real situations, the psychological connection to what is at stake on the macro-scale loses emphasis to what is at stake on the micro-scale who are their comrades next to them. It is well known and proven that when the rounds fly, soldiers fight for their buddies next to them. It is only when the pounding of lead dies down and out, does the soldier reflect on the nobler causes. Thus these two aspects need each other to make the soldier an effective military machine.

Next up is mental strength which is quintessential for effective soldiering since this profession often puts one in many situations that are beyond daily pain, deprivation and fatigue thresholds.

We shall now move onto the paradigm that involves the physical capabilities of the effective soldier. Fitness is a two-dimensional requirement of the effective soldier. At the base level is physical fitness. Add on the burden of combat loads and stress of combat fatigue and deprivation and you have combat fitness. This then brings into emphasis the previous point of the importance of mental strength and bridges into our next point: Realistic training.

Realistic training is the next hallmark of the physical capabilities of the effective soldier. Realistic training saves the soldier in a real state of war as he knows what to expect. This transfers into the elimination of reflex time and the effective soldier operates on drilled efficient mechanical reflex. Many aspects of realistic training also dehumanizes the nasty psycho-social aspects of warfare (namely killing)and thus downplays emotive reactions that could prove detrimental to the actual execution of motions. If we explore what all this means, we should also come to realize and appreciate the importance and omnipresence of mental faculties in this factor as well.

7. On War: Clausewitz's "On War"

Of course, this is a must read for my inquiry into the topic. The book that inspired and shaped much of contemporary thought on the topic. In this post, I shall be touching on the various significant concepts that I picked up from this essential text.

Clausewitz puts forth his conceptualization of the operating levels of war. Politics or policy lies outside these operating levels but is the root cause of the existent of the resultant operating levels of war as Clausewitz puts it. It can take the form of hostile or peaceful.

Strategy is the overarching macro level. Its aim is the destruction of the enemy's spirit and cohesion by determining the enemy's center of gravity and focus upon it. Clausewitz speaks of war in its limited political scope since once the destruction of the enemy's spirit and cohesion is achieved, the killing should cease. Strategy takes two forms; offensive or defensive. Next comes a modern operating level of war: Operations. Strategy is perhaps the most important because it can lead directly to peace. Thus a general must be in tune with state policy and the military should be under the control of the political.

Operations was made possible with the Napoleonic invention of corps since this meant that the self-sufficient formations could successfully engage in operations by itself.

Next the last operating level of war exists in the "Lowest" tangible realm. But as Clausewitz puts it (and most do not see the existence of this important argument of his)since success in this operating level of war determines strategy. So strategy must always keep tactics in consideration.

Another essential point was what Clausewitz argued that light cavalry and infantry did more than screening the main body of troops. This adds onto my argument about individualism in the state of war since such troops in the era of gunpowder and marching armies needed to be more motivated, more tactically intelligent and needed to be more loyal (since they were absent from the constant scrutiny and command scope of their commanders). This traits of individualism were essential since they were engaged in independent operations and needed flexible tactics to survive and achieve their tactical aims. To add onto this aspect, Clausewitz also recognized the lethality of this modern way of warfare and stated that modern wars should vitalize individual energies as far as the weapon permits and cease to use men like simple machines. This was truly a step in increasing the scope of individualism in the state of war.

5. On War: Individualism and the Military in war (of landed infantry)

I wish to examine the correlation between Individualism and the Military in the situation of war(of landed infantry). I ask, "Is it correct to say that collectivism has always dominated over individualism when it comes to the situation of war?" I argue that collectivism has always dominated over individualism in the military sphere but individualism is possible and increasingly cultivated (albeit of a compartmentalized kind) in the modern battlefield. So it seems logical to go on to ask: How is this possible? And what does this compartmentalized individualism "look" like?

I understand Individualism as a socio-political concept that manifests itself in certain positive traits such as self-reliance and independence. In the extreme, it can come to mean that an individual's goals and interest comes to take center stage and can supercede and dominate over the goals and interests of the collective and culminate in a form of a "self-interested" individual. Thus the concept of individualism surely is in sharp contrast with all that we associate with the military sphere with its culture of conformity and strong group identity.

So the peculiar form of compartmentalized individualism that I will be referring to in this discussion is one that focuses on the increased importance of self-reliance and scoped decision-making. But the individual's social identity is still fixed within the group identity and the individual's goals and interests still lay second fiddle to those of the collective due to the fundamental mission-based nature of the military sphere. But it is important to take note here that just because the individual's goals and interests are dominated over, it does not mean that soldiers are cannon-fodder. In fact in democratic cultures, we find that the emphasis on taking care of the well-being of the soldier is increasingly important. I seek to examine the validity of my argument through the various epochs of military history. We begin with the Phalangite era when the importance and dominance of group tactics come to crush over the effectiveness of individual skirmishing. This era clearly puts the idea of collectivism over individualism as the soldier turns himself into a part of a mechanized killing machine. He was a sum of parts. Simple pyschology proved to successfully condition the phalangite as the man in the unit was "pushed" forward by the legs behind him and assured by the sarissas all around him. Perhaps individualism was only displayed by army commanders who required guile and tactics in order to lead his men to victory. But the bulk of the efficient Macedonian, then Roman and later Frankish pikemen all proved the unconquerable efficiency of the collective in that era of the Phalanx. When we move onto the era of gunpowder and marching armies, the inaccuracy of the dominant weapon was a limiter. This technological limiter made drilled rank and file volley fire a more advantageous way of fighting. Also, drilled rank and file and facing down cannon fire made for the necessity of instilling iron discipline. The soldiers needed to be more afraid of their officers than the opposite side so that commanders could wield their men to face off, exchange volleys with the opposition and march over to claim land all in the face of exploding gunpowder and walls of lead. Thus collectivism triumphed out of necessity and efficiency over Individualism again in this era.

When firearms became more accurate, individualism became to grow in importance. This was heralded with the advent of riflemen as opposed to musketeers even during the previously discussed era of gunpowder and marching armies. Individualism hit a wall again during the stalemate engagements of WW1. This time the efficiency of technology was a limiter on individualism as tactics that were still rooted in the Nineteenth century could not keep up with the new surgically efficient killing machine gun. Commanders went about planning with an outmoded expectation of “good soldiering" which led to millions of lives wasted as cannon fodder. Numbers and human waves of charges called for little need for individualism. Too much thought-process could jeopardize the charge in fact and leave already committed comrades stranded ahead. A bolt out of the blue, storm-troopers were to prove a display of individualism and bravery intended to break the stalemate but could not counter the general macro-situation of the poorly coping battlefield tactics of the era. (I pause here to insert the clause that I have a sinking suspicion that in the novel new theatre of air combat, individualism flourished. To what extent and why, I cannot conclusively say now because admittedly, my knowledge in this area is insufficient to pose any coherent argument. I shall investigate further. :P )

Past the static lines of WW1,scattered group tactics grew in importance and pitched battles faded away in importance in WW2. Commanders came to recognize that decentralized fighting required more individualism. The movement away from pitched battles meant that warfare became more and more dynamic and ever new circumstances needed split-second decision-making and self-reliance from soldiers on the ground.

Move over to the modern armies of today's battlefields and we see that modern combatants face an even greater array of threats and opportunities. The need for co-ordinated arms warfare in the modern battlefields has also brought the share of decision-making increasingly down into the hands of the individual soldier (notably small unit leaders). Yet another a post-WW2 phenomenon, the advent of asymmetrical warfare also places emphasis on the guile, devotion and tactics of the individual soldier. The importance of compartmentalized individualism has never bewn stronger...

The question of "Effective Sovereignty"

Brought some kids to HACA'09 last thursday and this was one of the questions which arose during the presentation round. "Is UN Intervention in line with its role of safeguarding of state sovereignty?"

The students answered that on the grounds of effective sovereignty arising from social contract, a state would forfeit its right to effective sovereignty if it worked the ill sufferings of its people. But this statement is iffy. In the perfect scenario, the people confer the legitimacy of power unto the ruling party. But this is problematic because a social contract assumes that all parties in power come about by voluntary and consent. This however is not always the case as parties can wrestle their way to power and then dominate the populace with a monopoly of force. A social contract is not always existent. So from a realist point of view, this particular stance of their's is swept under the rug.

However we should judge the argument on the school on which it is formulated. Thus we will now apply the liberal lens. We move onto examine if the UN grounds of intervention is in line with its role of safeguarding state sovereignty. I say yes although some may argue that UN intervention on the grounds of HR violations puts the rights of the individual above those of the nation-state. However if we delve deeper, we find this not to be the case and instead both are reconcilable in true nature. To this, we turn to the rightful scope of UN intervention which is limited in nature. The aims of UN intervention is to put a stop to HR violations. It does not intervene to take over a country and operate as its state. Thus I see this as a utilitarian liberal action, which serves to achieve the greatest good with a little "evil".

Next, we look from the liberal HR lens and analyze the situation. The party in power and its people are all equal as human beings under the HR lens. Thus they do not have any inherent rights over and above their people. By acting contrary to this, they are in effect performing a violation of HR as a private individual. Were it a usual civilian act of transgression then they would be trialled as a citizen of the state under its laws. But since a HR violation by a party or individual in power is directed towards a large group of people and trangresses International Law, thus they then would be rightfully trialled under International Law. Thus it is not so much as a question of an individual's rights over the State's but rather an affirmative action of the equality of all individuals' rights.

Now lastly, a Realist sprinkling of power politics come into play. Authoritarian regimes or ruling individuals with authoritarian tendencies may argue that liberals are transgressing their own rules by intervention and scream bloody murder when they see UN-backed troops crashing into their backyards to arrest them. The simple fact of the matter is that the ones with the muscle can decide the rules and what matters. At the end of the day, it really does not matter as much what you feel is "right" when the current reality of international politics and law is now liberal in stance. Man has always used his fist to protect his ideas and his fellow kind.

3. Mein Kampf: Hitler on the State (a Folkish state, education and military service)

Hitler goes about to clear up certain "misconceptions" of the state. He is idea of what a Folkish state should be is highly "ethno-centric" and asserts that the state is not simply a more or less voluntary grouping of people under a government power. In the modern corruption, the state no longer exists to serve men; men exist in order to worship a state. Thus it is not an end but a means. It is the premise for the foundation of a higher human culture.

However, the state's highest state is the preservation and intensification of the race as a community of physically and psychically homogeneous creatures, this then is the fundamental condition of all human cultural development. The perils of racial mixing as put forth by Hitler have already been discussed in the previous posting. His German Reich must embrace all Germans and assemble and preserve the most valuable of basic racial elements in this people so as to slowly but surely raise them to a dominant position.

The Folkish state must then undertake certain "positive interventions" into the lives of their citizens. Firstly, Hitler states that it raise marriage from the level of a continuous defilement of the race and give it the consecration of a institution which produces images of the Lord and not half-apes. It must declare unfit of propagation those who are visibly sick and diseased or mentally handicapped.

Education focuses on physical training for a citizen with firm character and strength is more valuable than an intellectual weakling. Boxing is to be encouraged as it imbues and nurtures the spirit of attack, lightning decisions and trains the body in steel dexterity. Once the German child passes through school, it does not mean that the state's right to supervise its young citizens suddenly ceases. This right is a duty and is equally present at all times. Education for the males in its broad outlines serve as a preparation for future military service. Only then will the army be the rightful last and highest school of patriotic education. Whereas for females, it culminates in their role as future mothers.

The German soldier must have superior training in peacetime and have self-confidence in his superiority and the invincibility of his people which will not be lost even in the terror of the greatest battles. During military service, the boy will be transformed into a man and learns to obey and later command. His citizen's diploma is earned by completion of his military service which admits him to public activity and his health certificate confirms his physical health for marriage.

2. Mein Kampf: Hitler on Nation and Race

Hitler's writings on Nation and Race are a one-dimensional reading of Nietzsche's philosophy of the Uber-mensch.

The stronger must dominate and not blend with the weaker, thus sacrificing his own greatness. Only the born weakling can view this as cruel. In nature, you will never find a fox who in his inner attitude might, for example, show humanitarian tendencies toward geese. Nature's daily struggles are always a means for improving a species' health and power of resistance is a cause of higher development.

The result of all racial crossing is the lowering of the level of the higher race and physical, intellectual regression is the beginning of a slowly but surely progressing sickness.

We can divide mankind into three groups, the founders, the bearers and the destroyers of culture. True genius which is found in founders is always inborn and never cultivated, let alone learned. The founders of all progressive human culture and civilizations are Aryans. The Aryan founders also possess a self-sacrificing will to give one's personal labor and of necessary one's own life for others is most strongly developed. However, for the formation of such higher cultures, the existance of lower human types is essential as a precondition. As such is natural, the strong dominates the weak and directs his energies for their mutual good.

The mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is the Jew. Their instinct for self-preservation is most developed and no other people have gone through greater upheavals and remained unchanged. Their sense of solidarity is not positive either since it is based on the very primitive herd instinct. This primitive heard instinct only exists in the face of danger and dissipates into self-quarreling once any danger is over.

1. Mein Kampf: Hitler on Propaganda

I am currently reading Mein Kampf (Finally! This is a book that I have been intellectually salivating for since the time that I was in JC) As of now, my comments about this book are as follows, "Intellectually uninspiring but highly important as it is historically revealing from hindsight." What am I to expect? I knew all along that Hitler was no intellectual. But still, there are many important points to highight.

Having learnt much from the "superior" war propaganda being unleashed upon the German soldiers in WW1, Hitler argues on how to perfect the art of Propaganda:

Is propaganda a means or an end? It is a means and must therefore be judged with regard to its end. It must consequently take a form calculated to support the aim which it serves.

The German nation was involved in a struggle for a human existence and the purpose of war propaganda should have been yp support this struggle; its aim to bring about victory.

When nations on this planet fight for existence.....then all considerations of humanitarianism or aesthetics crumble into nothingness. As such, these two concepts are inapplicable to propaganda.
Propaganda must be addressed always and exclusively to the masses. It must attract the attention of the crowd by form and color. Its function lies in calling the masses' attention to certain facts, processes and necessities.

Consequently, the greater the mass it is intended to reach, the lower its purely intellectual level will have to be. This is because receptivity of the masses is veyr limited. thier intelligience is small but thier power of forgetting is enormous.

It was absolutely wrong to make the enemy ridiculous (as the German authorities did in WW1) becuase actual conflict with the enemy would arouse an entirely different conviction and the results would be devastating. By contrast, British war propaganda rightfully prepared thier side for the terrors of war and thus helped to preserve them from disappointments.

Next, propaganda is not to weight the rights of different people but to exclusively emphasize the one right which it has set out to argue for. It is to serve our own right, always and unflinchingly.

This sentiment and message should not be complicated but bery simple and all of a piece. This way, it does not lead to no half-statements that might have given rise to doubts.

As a whole, all pieces of propaganda must have a common outline and never depart from it. This then must be performed with steady, consistent emphasis which would allow our final success to mature.

Up next, Hitler on Race and Nation