1. Fight Philosophy: Krav Maga

In this post, I will be comparing the main tenets of Krav Maga's fight philosophy against the political realist philosophy.

Pre-emptive attack: This rests on the assumption that the defender is weaker and needs the element of surprise. Another assumption is that the attacker is indeed aggressive enough to take action. But then again on the other hand, no action may mean harm to the defender.

From another angle of analysis, a pre-emptive attack is one method of power maximization, the quinessential asset to a realist player in order to ensure his survival.

“Fast in and out”: The amount of damage dealt to the attacker stops once attacker is unable to attack anymore. In essence, this is a ethical use of strength and power with limits.

Multiple assailants: Humans, being pack animals, can and will gang up on the Krav Maga defender. By being aggressive against one of the multiple assailants first, the Krav Maga defender is creating an tactical opening and is also striking at the unity of their collective will, Their collective unity would have to be tested against the individual “fight of flight” and it would make them question if it is worth it to attack such a pugnacious defender.

“Borrowing from the best”: Everything works so long as it works. The over-arching philosophy behind Krav Maga's choice of style and combatives is efficiency, not ideology.

“A creature of its environment”: Having been born out of the aftermath of the WW2 and Yom Kippur war, the original creators of Krav Maga would find that reality is harsh and so too the combat system must be. When transferred to the anarchic reality of the street, we find that the Krav Maga defender must play by the rules (or lack of) in order to survive.

“I am no superhero”: the Krav Maga defender will attempt to de-escalate the hostility of the situation because the defender knows full well the dangers of combat.

“An elusive creature”: This is where the value of verbal disarming comes into play as the Krav Maga defender appears submissive and the neutral stance which he adopts can explode into bursting combatives at any second. All these means that the Krav Maga defender is an elusive creature for the attacker to read.

“The chain is only as strong as its weakest link”: Krav Maga combatives are all aimed at the weakest spots in the human anatomy because that is the fastest way to end a fight and the attacker is always assumed to be stronger. This is another method of power maximisation.

“Tragic Realism”: as witnessed by point 1 and 3, Krav Maga operates on a level of “pessimistic realism” which is important to understand. Because merely looking at the dangers ahead and resigning oneself to it inevitability is cynicism. Looking at the dangers ahead and preparing accordingly is pessimism.

On Civilisation (John Armstrong)

Armstrong's thoughts are very much in sync with my own on agents of change, love and art as bridging towards the truth. In this book, he brings in an extra dimension of civilisation as the societal life-support system in the environment of freedom in order to nurture high-quality relationships between people and their ideas and objects. He defines such high-quality relationships as enabling the flourishing of our human nature. Such relationships are beyond attachment and obsession and invoke a questioning of worth and value.

And so this adds onto my idea: that free agents come together/ act seperately in order to foster a society with a nurturing environment with the aim of developing human flourishing (freeing the others from the social realm of pain and thereby allowing them to look upon and explore concepts of value).

But this is no airy-fairy idealism for he acknowledges that material support must be present in order to allow for such flourishing to happen. Very importantly, he even goes on to defend worldy goods and that they are not the cause of us being spiritually/ innerly deficient. He posits that it is not material comfort that has beguiled us from the path but that we have not grown sufficiently in our inner world. And this is because we allow our attachment to material goods to be just that. We do not use them as conduits in which to explore and develop our concepts of value. To achieve this, we must go, "So I love having this/admiring this object, but why do I love it? What does my love for this object then tell me about myself?"

Another important point that Armstrong puts forth is the distinction between "happiness" and "flourishing" and that we should aim for the latter since happiness is a buoyant inner state but not grounded in action and character. This brings into emphasis the new maxim that I shall adopt for next year, "How can I be of help to others today?" We must help each other deal with the challenges of mortality in the outer realm where the tangible realities bite at us on the most immediate level. And when happiness can be achieved, we must guide others on to a flourishing state.

13. On War- The "Warrior's Vanity"

In this post, I shall combine lines of thought from Azar Gat and Leo Braudy and explore the significance of the "Warrior's Vanity" as a sub-cultural superstructure in sustaining the soldierly ethos. (as termed in my previous post, "On war- What makes an effective soldier?"

Azar Gat starts us off with his argument of the evolutionary strain on all facets of human civilization and their origins from the innate biological drives that derive from our reproductive and sustenance needs. Everything else that is to be (which Azar understands with a Marxist conceptual aid as the cultural super-structure) has its roots from these biological drives, whether directly or indirectly.

Similarly, the evolutionary strain runs it course and casts its effects on the sub-cultural super-structure of the warring class/ group as well. Leo Braudy termed this set of values as "Code of Honor" which many have used before him. However, I posit that my term, the "Warrior's Vanity", lends an extra dimension of conceptual appreciation to this set of values. Firstly as Braudy argues, the code of honor needs to be affirmed by an appropriate audience. This feeds the warrior's vanity for he wishes to be desired/ respected and admired for his displays of courage and skill in battle. It is both self-affirming and reinforcing of the expectations of soldierly conduct in battle.

The significance of this much prized and justified source of vanity is that it helps signal the boundaries of exclusive membership which is highly important to all sub-cultures. Secondly, as explained above, it serves to anchor membership. Lastly, it posits the individual to rise above personal interest and ensures the thriving of the warring group's endeavors.

12. On War- The myth of US tactical and technological superiority in the Vietnam War

Most talk of the US's impressive kill ratio in the Vietnam war. They would argue that the US won the mainforce war with their superior technology but lost the domestic and international political war. But Paddy Griffith argues a different case as he focuses on the weaknesses of the US's technology and tactics which ultimately led to a slow and uncertain mainforce victory which inadvertently led to a unfavorable domestic and international political slant towards their war effort. In his argument, the US's tactical and technological superiority over the NVA was by no means overwhelming.

Firstly, Griffith argues that the US did not succeed as they thought that they would in the area of surveillance. Surveillance is of paramount importance when faced with an enemy based on guerrilla tactics. The physical constraints of the environment gave strength to the NVA's already elusive nature due to the denseness of the jungle and the cloak of the nights. Chemical defoliation and large scale land clearing helped but did little to improve the overall situation. Aerial surveillance also failed to penetrate the canopy. The unmanned sensors of the Mcnamara wall seemed to deliver the promise of penetrating the canopy and saving manpower. However, maintainence of the unmanned sensors and the need for follow-up action meant that it was only an auxillary and never a subsitute for the soldier on the ground. Proponents for the wall talk of the success of FSB Crook and its success with its sensors but similarly impressive kill-rates were also accomplished by FSBs with no sensors.

Next, Giffith turns to examine the lethality of US forces in mobile warfare with the enemy. General Westmoreland in late 1965 put forth the doctrine of "Search and Destroy" in order to capture the initiative in the war effort. But the problem was that the enemy was near impossible to locate before he sprang an ambush. Preparatory fire was thus used in order to flush out any NVA before US forces landed anywhere and also to boost US force morale. However, this was counterproductive as it signaled their arrival and the NVA knew when to hide and where to later attack. As a rule of thumb, US forces thus still found themselves ambushed by the NVA who had good fire discipline and would pin down the US forces with their initial initiative. The US forces would then reply by slowly escalating the level of their return fire (small arms to MG to mortar to Artillery/ Air strikes) Popular media protrays this escalation of firepower as utterly devastating on the NVA. Griffith argues otherwise. Firstly, fire orders were not accurate given that the fog of war was given a boost by the dense jungles. Artillery fire would then suffer from hesitance and/ or inaccuracy. Also the NVA would smartly close in with the US forces thus only their extended flank and rear columns (if any) would be vulnerable to US supporting arms fire as they would not risk hitting their own. Mortars also needed clearings and these were hard to find in the jungles. Heliborne support fire suffered from low aerial visibility. If the US forces threw smoke signals, the NVA would follow suit so as to confuse the pilots. Also, heli-borne support fire suffered from the inherent technical need for helicopters' high maintenance hours (thus there would often be too little and too few). Fixed wing support fire carried bigger payloads and thus needed larger safer ranges and so they mostly served as interdiction and/or counter-battery work.

Griffith then moves on to debunk the myth of the next chain in the alleged US tactical and technological superiority chain: its mobility. Or rather, air mobility as was the case in the Vietnam war. Air mobility rested on the sturdy backs of the helicopters. However, heli-borne operations suffered from many constraints. Helicopters needed LZs and the jungle terrain made their options scarce. LZs had to be cleared laboriously and maintained. LZs also needed to be "cold" lest helicopters would be lost to NVA sniping fire. Thus security was another issue. Heli-borne troops in dense jungles also tended to be lightly armed and their much vaunted mobility reverted back to foot mobility once they landed. Of course, they still had immense advantages of speed over their foot-slogging predecessors but their mobile advantage must not be exaggerated. LZs tended to be out of operation areas since they would be too "hot". This also meant that when casualties needed to be evacuated, US troops would have to fight their way out of sticky encirclement situations in order to reach their LZs in a mad-scramble to disengage.

Fourthly in a connected line of thought, Griffith then goes on to contemplate the extra-tactical dimension that the political necessity of evacuating their wounded placed limitations on US mobility. Many operations were virtually halted as it became necessary to secure the evacuation of casualties. Real time effort and attention which could have been used to pursue the NVA would then be needed to pull them back to the LZs.

Thus because of these reasons, he surmises that the US forces often did not "fire and manoeuvre" but instead the US infanrty simply found the NVA and then "manoeuvre and fire". They puckered down, made an all-round defence, ordered for supporting arms, sat tight, fought desperately out to evacuate their wounded and did not pursue the NVA. Thus the NVA were seldom decisively beat in mainforce war and this protracted the conflict.

11. On War- The myth of Nuclear Deterrence

In this lecture, Wilson Ward debunks the myth that the dropping of the Atomic bombs were the main reason that Imperial Japan surrendered. He argues that in fact it served as a convenient political face-saver. He also argues why in the modern era, the continued proliferation of Nuclear weaponary makes world security even more tenuous.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BFyfK43mEk

Follow the link above to the video lecture.

10. On War: Expansion on "Why men fight?"

Azar Gat's "War in Human Civilisation" has expanded some of my prior thoughts about the "resource" explanation for why man fight. This considerations were absent from my previous conceptualizations because of my lack of knowledge in this particular econo-environmental sphere. Resources can cause conflicts by virtue of them being resources. How so? This post will explain how.

Azar Gat expands my thoughts about the topic that low-yield environments simply requires larger territories for subsistence, Nor does wide spacing out mean that there are empty spaces to move to. As a rule, species quickly fill up their particular habitat and soon push against its boundaries.

Even in lush environments, the classical Rousseauite anthropological imagination is not valid since simple hunter-gatherers are in fact restricted nomads or centrally based wanderers. These territories were sanctioned by totem and myth and trespassers would provoke severe aggression.

In addition, "plenty of resources" is only relative. The more resource rich a region, the more people it attracts from outside, and the more internal population growth will take place. Thus a new equilibrium will eventually be reached and recreating the same tenuous ratio of subsistence.

Human needs can also be overtaken by human desire. (as I previously pointed out under perceived importance of resources)Human competition then increases with abundance and deficiency. With abundance, some monopolize access to resources and others try to upset this pattern of allocation. Also, ostentatious consumption comes into play with decorative items which are possessed and coveted for prestige purposes. These would come in the form of crafted scarce resources. Such monopolies and social positions would add onto the ability of such "Big Men" to have future access to resources.

9. On War: Revolution (Hannah Arendt) and its recourse to freedom

I am sidetracking a bit and exploring one particular form of war: a revolutionary war and starting off with understanding it in its political context. With Arendt's book, we have an insight into two revolutions: the American and French and explore the factors that led to its different outcomes. For now from hindsight, we have come to understand revolution as an action (which may constitute war) to freedom. But Arendt breaks down our lens of presentism and she starts off with the exploration of the term. The term "revolution" dates back to Machiavelli but it meant originally restoration. In the initial stags of both American and French revolution, firmly convinced that they could do no more than restore an old order that had been violated and disturbed. They merely wanted to revolve back to old times. The metaphoric use of it in political language also carried with it the notion of irresistibility and it being removed from all human influence. In addition, Hegel's historical processes convinced all who followed in the revolutionary footsteps of the French revolution that they were agents of history and historical necessity

She then moves on the social question and states that poverty was almost absent from American scene, the poor in America were laborious but not miserable. Darkness rather than want is the curse of poverty. French liberation from tyranny meant freedom for few if most were still loaded down by their misery. They had to be liberated once more from the yoke of necessity. And in comes compassion which abolishes the distance because it is easier to suffer than to see others suffer. With it, they claimed for swift and direct action, action with the means of violence. But solidarity was aroused by suffering but not guided by it. It is guided by and committed to ideas and translates into an emotion-laden insensitivity to reality. When pity is taken as the spring of virtue, holds a greater capacity for cruelty than cruelty itself. The action of violence may appear irresistible because it lives from the necessity of biological life itself thus the rebellions of the belly are the worst. Arendt points out that the direction of American revolution remained committed to foundation of freedom and establishment of lasting institutions since there was no sufferings around them to lead them astray from reason.

Another point was that the men of French revolution used freedom in novel way which could exist only in public, away from free will and thought. All except the ruling class suffered from obscurity because the public realm was invisible to them and they lacked the public space where they themselves could become visible. Tyranny then became understood as the form of government in which the ruler ruled out of his own will and in pursuit of his own interests, thus monopolized for himself the right of action in public realm (even though he may rule for their good and according to laws)

The two revolutions were also influenced by the type of power they overthrew. The Americans separated powers because only power can arrest power. To do this, they needed to create more power, an entirely new power center and they followed the model of limited monarchy that they overthrew, never even tempted to derive law and power from the same source. Power from the people but law from the constitution. Now what about the source of law? From the constitution, “we hold these truths to be self-evident” which meant that agreement between those who have embarked upon revolution was pre-rational. It informed reason but was not its product. Thus the source of law was not held by the American but they were held by this divinely informed reason. However, the overthrow of French absolutism meant that they had to find an absolute from which to derive authority for law and power and they could not find it in religion anymore. Both power and law in the French model was anchored in the will of the nation which was above and outside all government and law. This led it to be easily manipulated by someone willing to take the burden upon himself and majority decision degenerated in majority rule where the minority was pushed out.

The American revolution was also born of promises. The American revolutionists realized that whatever men may be in their singularity (good or evil) could bind themselves into a community and this need not necessarily reflect the sinful side of men. For them, binding and combining were the means by men join together for the purpose of action and is by which power is kept in existence and this was done from the start prior to the revolution. Thus in the American model, we witnessed force (through binding and combining) and power (kept in existence and binding and combining and kept in check by separating power) but in the French, we witnessed violence and power (both of which were born out of violence and seated in the will of the nation which was above and beyond the body politic and in nature, could not be kept in check).