2. On War: Clausewitz's "On War" and John Keagan's "A history of Warfare"

War must never be seen as a purpose to itself, but as a means of physically forcing one's will on an opponent ("War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.")

War as a purpose to itself presupposes that man is biologically driven to warring. This is an argument which is hard to make and sustain. However, Keagan then adds that Clausewitz did not factor in that war is also a cultural instrument and a cultural act. It is not entirely governed by the dynanism of all-imposing political forces. Indeed, it can be governed by static, revisionist forces such as culture.
In western military history, this was observed in the aristocracies' undying grip on the honor and exclusivity of the idea of the "Flower Calvary" which resulted in disastrous showings at Balaclava (from "War and Civilisation: Blood and Iron") for example, a prime example of culture obstinately preserving a style of warring despite real political realities. This was again demonstrated by the Japanese Samurai which had effectively employed gunpowder for realpolitik and then forcefully reinstated their Samurai way of warring once gunpowder had achieved its purpose. However, is this then not political? As Keagan later explains, the Samurai could accomplish this as there were no gunpowder weapon wielding enemies at their doorsteps.? Is this not an absence of a particular political reality which allowed them to put culture above politics?

Secondly, I agree more with Weigly who states that war is not so much a continuation of political commerce but also one of political bankrupty. This would resonate with what Frantz Fanon put forth and many freedom-fighters such as the LTTE and the IRA who have found that peaceful demands are empty and achieve little. Their appreciation of their own state of political bankruptcy then forces war upon them as an additional means to continue their political commerce.

Lastly, my understanding of the concept “Politics” is perhaps more inclusive and al-encompassing than Clausewitz’s and Keagan’s. Thus I see Keagan’s argument of incidences of cultural primacy in the preservation and promotion of various warring styles not as arguing against Clausewitz but adding on. Such historical experiences that he highlighted are highly political as they all involve and revolve around the quinessential element of politics, Power. After all, the Japanese generals who united Japan successfully and reinstated the Cult of the Sword only because they had the political means to do so. And later when confronted with the American fleet and forced to modernize some 250 years later, the political necessity won out and dictated the style of warring. As uncle Chua rightfully puts it, the image of the desert raider brandishing his sword before an unimpressed Indiana Jones in "Raiders of the Lost Ark" and getting nonchalantly blazed down proves the potency and uncompromising pressure of real politics on the style of warring.

Indeed, war in the political realm is a political instrument of violence that is undertaken to continue political commerce or break political bankrupty in order to achieve power (of its many forms) over other parties or in issues.