Sunday, September 20, 2009

10. On War: Expansion on "Why men fight?"

Azar Gat's "War in Human Civilisation" has expanded some of my prior thoughts about the "resource" explanation for why man fight. This considerations were absent from my previous conceptualizations because of my lack of knowledge in this particular econo-environmental sphere. Resources can cause conflicts by virtue of them being resources. How so? This post will explain how.

Azar Gat expands my thoughts about the topic that low-yield environments simply requires larger territories for subsistence, Nor does wide spacing out mean that there are empty spaces to move to. As a rule, species quickly fill up their particular habitat and soon push against its boundaries.

Even in lush environments, the classical Rousseauite anthropological imagination is not valid since simple hunter-gatherers are in fact restricted nomads or centrally based wanderers. These territories were sanctioned by totem and myth and trespassers would provoke severe aggression.

In addition, "plenty of resources" is only relative. The more resource rich a region, the more people it attracts from outside, and the more internal population growth will take place. Thus a new equilibrium will eventually be reached and recreating the same tenuous ratio of subsistence.

Human needs can also be overtaken by human desire. (as I previously pointed out under perceived importance of resources)Human competition then increases with abundance and deficiency. With abundance, some monopolize access to resources and others try to upset this pattern of allocation. Also, ostentatious consumption comes into play with decorative items which are possessed and coveted for prestige purposes. These would come in the form of crafted scarce resources. Such monopolies and social positions would add onto the ability of such "Big Men" to have future access to resources.

Friday, September 18, 2009

9. On War: Revolution (Hannah Arendt) and its recourse to freedom

I am sidetracking a bit and exploring one particular form of war: a revolutionary war and starting off with understanding it in its political context. With Arendt's book, we have an insight into two revolutions: the American and French and explore the factors that led to its different outcomes. For now from hindsight, we have come to understand revolution as an action (which may constitute war) to freedom. But Arendt breaks down our lens of presentism and she starts off with the exploration of the term. The term "revolution" dates back to Machiavelli but it meant originally restoration. In the initial stags of both American and French revolution, firmly convinced that they could do no more than restore an old order that had been violated and disturbed. They merely wanted to revolve back to old times. The metaphoric use of it in political language also carried with it the notion of irresistibility and it being removed from all human influence. In addition, Hegel's historical processes convinced all who followed in the revolutionary footsteps of the French revolution that they were agents of history and historical necessity

She then moves on the social question and states that poverty was almost absent from American scene, the poor in America were laborious but not miserable. Darkness rather than want is the curse of poverty. French liberation from tyranny meant freedom for few if most were still loaded down by their misery. They had to be liberated once more from the yoke of necessity. And in comes compassion which abolishes the distance because it is easier to suffer than to see others suffer. With it, they claimed for swift and direct action, action with the means of violence. But solidarity was aroused by suffering but not guided by it. It is guided by and committed to ideas and translates into an emotion-laden insensitivity to reality. When pity is taken as the spring of virtue, holds a greater capacity for cruelty than cruelty itself. The action of violence may appear irresistible because it lives from the necessity of biological life itself thus the rebellions of the belly are the worst. Arendt points out that the direction of American revolution remained committed to foundation of freedom and establishment of lasting institutions since there was no sufferings around them to lead them astray from reason.

Another point was that the men of French revolution used freedom in novel way which could exist only in public, away from free will and thought. All except the ruling class suffered from obscurity because the public realm was invisible to them and they lacked the public space where they themselves could become visible. Tyranny then became understood as the form of government in which the ruler ruled out of his own will and in pursuit of his own interests, thus monopolized for himself the right of action in public realm (even though he may rule for their good and according to laws)

The two revolutions were also influenced by the type of power they overthrew. The Americans separated powers because only power can arrest power. To do this, they needed to create more power, an entirely new power center and they followed the model of limited monarchy that they overthrew, never even tempted to derive law and power from the same source. Power from the people but law from the constitution. Now what about the source of law? From the constitution, “we hold these truths to be self-evident” which meant that agreement between those who have embarked upon revolution was pre-rational. It informed reason but was not its product. Thus the source of law was not held by the American but they were held by this divinely informed reason. However, the overthrow of French absolutism meant that they had to find an absolute from which to derive authority for law and power and they could not find it in religion anymore. Both power and law in the French model was anchored in the will of the nation which was above and outside all government and law. This led it to be easily manipulated by someone willing to take the burden upon himself and majority decision degenerated in majority rule where the minority was pushed out.

The American revolution was also born of promises. The American revolutionists realized that whatever men may be in their singularity (good or evil) could bind themselves into a community and this need not necessarily reflect the sinful side of men. For them, binding and combining were the means by men join together for the purpose of action and is by which power is kept in existence and this was done from the start prior to the revolution. Thus in the American model, we witnessed force (through binding and combining) and power (kept in existence and binding and combining and kept in check by separating power) but in the French, we witnessed violence and power (both of which were born out of violence and seated in the will of the nation which was above and beyond the body politic and in nature, could not be kept in check).

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

8. On War- "Aiya! Singapore just kena one Atomic bomb, all die already. What is the point of defending?"

*Briefly translated- Singapore is of such a small landmass that if we were to suffer an attack from an atomic/ nuclear weapon, we would definitely all be wiped out. Thus what is the point of defending Singapore at all?*

If you are a Singaporean adult like me, I am sure that you have been hearing kids of all ages from the years when we were young till now who state this claim. And if you are like me, you would no doubt feel the intellectual exasperation. And if you are an adult but do not see any problem with the above exclamation, please take a seat with the children while I shall once and for all put this claim to rest.

In this post, I shall argue the case of "Theory meets Reality" on the various claims of the statement above.

Firstly,Singapore is of such a small landmass and concentrated density that if we were to suffer an attack from an atomic/ nuclear weapon, we would definitely be all wiped out. Yes, this is a definite. Most if not all of us would be wiped out. Why? The terror of atomic/ nuclear weapons inflict direct damage through static, dynamic overpressure and thermal radiation which on impact with a human body would cause severe burning, hemorrhaging or air embolisms, either of which can be rapidly fatal.

The indirect effect of such weapons would be a nuclear fallout. This is because when added to the dust of radioactive material released by the bomb itself, a large amount of radioactive material is released into the environment. This form of radioactive contamination poses the primary risk of exposure to ionizing radiation for a large nuclear weapon. This radioactive dust, consisting of hot particles, is a kind of radioactive contamination. It can lead to the contamination of the animal food chain. Rapid death following high doses of penetrating whole-body radiation, to essentially normal lives for a variable period of time until the development of delayed radiation effects, in a portion of the exposed population, following low dose exposures. Late or delayed effects of radiation occur following a wide range of doses and dose rates. Delayed effects may appear months to years after irradiation and include a wide variety of effects involving almost all tissues or organs. Some of the possible delayed consequences of radiation injury are life shortening, carcinogenesis, cataract formation, chronic radiodermatitis, decreased fertility, and genetic mutations.

So yes in theory, if we were to suffer from an attack by such weapons, we would surely "all die already". But theory has to meet reality which is the hallmark of all sound argumentative statements.

What does it mean to possess a nuclear weapon? What does it cost? Let's explore the physical costs first. These would include the costs of research and development, fabrication, production and the infrastructure required for the launching/ deployment of these weapons. These costs come in the amounts of trillions. This realistically cuts down the amount of countries and individuals who are able to deploy such weapons.

Next and perhaps of more gravity are the political costs of even possessing such weapons. The political status of being a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) is high indeed. The first group of countries who are pushing up the entry of barrier so as to speak are the NWS already present who have every incentive to keep their club limited in size so as to keep the international Balance of Power in their favor. When a state acquires nuclear weapons ability, the cost of invading that state then tactically increases, since it becomes more difficult and expensive for the aggressor to gain a military edge. Then there are NWS supported multilateral pressures exerted by the likes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which seek to keep the BOP just the way it is. So any state who wished to acquire NWS status would have to run up against the big boys. And current US foreign policy, along with its allies and other powerful nuclear-armed states, have worked to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, while also attempting to coax rival NWS into decommissioning their nuclear weapons. And most importantly, US has been careful to leave some of its important allies with nuclear weapons in order to preserve the BOP in certain regions like Israel in the Middle East.

In this third section of this counter-argument, we must consider the possibility if a state would use atomic/ nuclear weapons against Singapore in the first place. The true value of such weapons lie in its deterrence and bargaining power. This is because the fear of reprisals from using such a morally objectionable weapon in this current world order would bear into the mental calculations of aggressors. We all are well-associated with the chilling end-game scenario that was the fear of all parties involved in the Cold War, "MAD" or Mutually-Assured Destruction.

Lastly we consider if Singapore even warrants an attack from such weapons. We are not tactically costly to defeat if we were to come face to face with a NWS who would logically have better military capabilities than us. So we would not be in the same situation as Japan in WW2 who doggedly refused to surrender and would cost the US millions of lives if US chose to launch a landed invasion. Secondly, Singapore would have to commit a seriously heinous international atrocity to warrant the use of such punitive and morally objectionable weapons on us. Thirdly, would we be even worth the attention and all the physical and political costs incurred to level such weapons against us? Fourthly and consider this: even if we were still in the age of conquest, occupation and harvesting of resources, Singapore is essentially an information exchange and trade hub and such "resources" would not be able to exploited by an aggressor who uses such weapons and obliterates all people and infrastructure in the act.

Saturday, September 12, 2009

6. On war- What makes an effective soldier in a state of War? (Micro-aspect)

This post is a refinement of the previous posting. I shall explore the question of "What makes an effective soldier in a state of war?" from the micro-aspect's two paradigms: the mental faculties and physical capabilities of the soldier. Before we carry forth, what is an "Effective" soldier? I understand effectiveness to mean that the soldier can carry out what is required of him/her in a real warring situation. And the micro-aspect will be understood as all the faculties and capacities of the individual soldier. Of course some of the assumptions of a micro-aspect below has to remain as a purely theoretical delimitation of boundaries.

We shall first concentrate on the mental faculties of the effective soldier. The first micro-condition that exists in this paradigm is initiative. This translates into a flexibility in tactics which allows the soldier to adapt, counter and exploit. This is very important because the uncertainty of war is ever certain. So initiative helps pierce through the "fog of war" and foster a higher chance of success despite very real uncertainties. But as argued in my earlier post, initiative as a offspring of individualism must still be subsumed as part of a strategic hold (collectivism) lest it becomes unorganized and threatens tactical coherency.

Volunteerism is the second micro-condition in the paradigm of mental faculties that I shall delve into. Volunteerism aids in the effectiveness of a soldier in three important areas. Firstly, a unit of volunteers has the confidence of dedication from the company of comrades because he/she knows that every boot on the ground next to him/her signed up for this. Second, a crucial psychological acceptance of one's lot also means that such soldiers can be pushed to greater limits in training or real situations. This undoubtedly translates into greater effectiveness. One can fall back upon one's conviction to have chosen to be there in times of ordeal to draw strength. Thirdly, all these gets spilled over into a positive sense of warriors' vanity. He/she is most likely to push himself/herself to perform so as to be accepted as worthy in the eyes of his/her fellow gritty-minded comrades. Attempts at one-up-manship will also ensue which would also lead to the volunteer soldier pushing his limits to perform.

Thirdly, every soldier needs a cause. And the most primordial and effective of causes is a personal stake. The most effective form is of course the cause of protection of personal kin and property. Thus most wars, even offensive ones, are masked with a defensive necessity. A soldier fighting to defend all that is all to him will more likely fight to the end since it is matter of survival. This is opposed to a raider or looter who fights only when it beneficial and flees to gain another day. The ardent (which is grounded in desperation and a closed situation) defender has to make every day of his count so as to defend all that is dear to him. In the most hard-hitting real situations, the psychological connection to what is at stake on the macro-scale loses emphasis to what is at stake on the micro-scale who are their comrades next to them. It is well known and proven that when the rounds fly, soldiers fight for their buddies next to them. It is only when the pounding of lead dies down and out, does the soldier reflect on the nobler causes. Thus these two aspects need each other to make the soldier an effective military machine.

Next up is mental strength which is quintessential for effective soldiering since this profession often puts one in many situations that are beyond daily pain, deprivation and fatigue thresholds.

We shall now move onto the paradigm that involves the physical capabilities of the effective soldier. Fitness is a two-dimensional requirement of the effective soldier. At the base level is physical fitness. Add on the burden of combat loads and stress of combat fatigue and deprivation and you have combat fitness. This then brings into emphasis the previous point of the importance of mental strength and bridges into our next point: Realistic training.

Realistic training is the next hallmark of the physical capabilities of the effective soldier. Realistic training saves the soldier in a real state of war as he knows what to expect. This transfers into the elimination of reflex time and the effective soldier operates on drilled efficient mechanical reflex. Many aspects of realistic training also dehumanizes the nasty psycho-social aspects of warfare (namely killing)and thus downplays emotive reactions that could prove detrimental to the actual execution of motions. If we explore what all this means, we should also come to realize and appreciate the importance and omnipresence of mental faculties in this factor as well.

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

7. On War: Clausewitz's "On War"

Of course, this is a must read for my inquiry into the topic. The book that inspired and shaped much of contemporary thought on the topic. In this post, I shall be touching on the various significant concepts that I picked up from this essential text.

Clausewitz puts forth his conceptualization of the operating levels of war. Politics or policy lies outside these operating levels but is the root cause of the existent of the resultant operating levels of war as Clausewitz puts it. It can take the form of hostile or peaceful.

Strategy is the overarching macro level. Its aim is the destruction of the enemy's spirit and cohesion by determining the enemy's center of gravity and focus upon it. Clausewitz speaks of war in its limited political scope since once the destruction of the enemy's spirit and cohesion is achieved, the killing should cease. Strategy takes two forms; offensive or defensive. Next comes a modern operating level of war: Operations. Strategy is perhaps the most important because it can lead directly to peace. Thus a general must be in tune with state policy and the military should be under the control of the political.

Operations was made possible with the Napoleonic invention of corps since this meant that the self-sufficient formations could successfully engage in operations by itself.

Next the last operating level of war exists in the "Lowest" tangible realm. But as Clausewitz puts it (and most do not see the existence of this important argument of his)since success in this operating level of war determines strategy. So strategy must always keep tactics in consideration.

Another essential point was what Clausewitz argued that light cavalry and infantry did more than screening the main body of troops. This adds onto my argument about individualism in the state of war since such troops in the era of gunpowder and marching armies needed to be more motivated, more tactically intelligent and needed to be more loyal (since they were absent from the constant scrutiny and command scope of their commanders). This traits of individualism were essential since they were engaged in independent operations and needed flexible tactics to survive and achieve their tactical aims. To add onto this aspect, Clausewitz also recognized the lethality of this modern way of warfare and stated that modern wars should vitalize individual energies as far as the weapon permits and cease to use men like simple machines. This was truly a step in increasing the scope of individualism in the state of war.