On Civilisation (John Armstrong)

Armstrong's thoughts are very much in sync with my own on agents of change, love and art as bridging towards the truth. In this book, he brings in an extra dimension of civilisation as the societal life-support system in the environment of freedom in order to nurture high-quality relationships between people and their ideas and objects. He defines such high-quality relationships as enabling the flourishing of our human nature. Such relationships are beyond attachment and obsession and invoke a questioning of worth and value.

And so this adds onto my idea: that free agents come together/ act seperately in order to foster a society with a nurturing environment with the aim of developing human flourishing (freeing the others from the social realm of pain and thereby allowing them to look upon and explore concepts of value).

But this is no airy-fairy idealism for he acknowledges that material support must be present in order to allow for such flourishing to happen. Very importantly, he even goes on to defend worldy goods and that they are not the cause of us being spiritually/ innerly deficient. He posits that it is not material comfort that has beguiled us from the path but that we have not grown sufficiently in our inner world. And this is because we allow our attachment to material goods to be just that. We do not use them as conduits in which to explore and develop our concepts of value. To achieve this, we must go, "So I love having this/admiring this object, but why do I love it? What does my love for this object then tell me about myself?"

Another important point that Armstrong puts forth is the distinction between "happiness" and "flourishing" and that we should aim for the latter since happiness is a buoyant inner state but not grounded in action and character. This brings into emphasis the new maxim that I shall adopt for next year, "How can I be of help to others today?" We must help each other deal with the challenges of mortality in the outer realm where the tangible realities bite at us on the most immediate level. And when happiness can be achieved, we must guide others on to a flourishing state.

13. On War- The "Warrior's Vanity"

In this post, I shall combine lines of thought from Azar Gat and Leo Braudy and explore the significance of the "Warrior's Vanity" as a sub-cultural superstructure in sustaining the soldierly ethos. (as termed in my previous post, "On war- What makes an effective soldier?"

Azar Gat starts us off with his argument of the evolutionary strain on all facets of human civilization and their origins from the innate biological drives that derive from our reproductive and sustenance needs. Everything else that is to be (which Azar understands with a Marxist conceptual aid as the cultural super-structure) has its roots from these biological drives, whether directly or indirectly.

Similarly, the evolutionary strain runs it course and casts its effects on the sub-cultural super-structure of the warring class/ group as well. Leo Braudy termed this set of values as "Code of Honor" which many have used before him. However, I posit that my term, the "Warrior's Vanity", lends an extra dimension of conceptual appreciation to this set of values. Firstly as Braudy argues, the code of honor needs to be affirmed by an appropriate audience. This feeds the warrior's vanity for he wishes to be desired/ respected and admired for his displays of courage and skill in battle. It is both self-affirming and reinforcing of the expectations of soldierly conduct in battle.

The significance of this much prized and justified source of vanity is that it helps signal the boundaries of exclusive membership which is highly important to all sub-cultures. Secondly, as explained above, it serves to anchor membership. Lastly, it posits the individual to rise above personal interest and ensures the thriving of the warring group's endeavors.

12. On War- The myth of US tactical and technological superiority in the Vietnam War

Most talk of the US's impressive kill ratio in the Vietnam war. They would argue that the US won the mainforce war with their superior technology but lost the domestic and international political war. But Paddy Griffith argues a different case as he focuses on the weaknesses of the US's technology and tactics which ultimately led to a slow and uncertain mainforce victory which inadvertently led to a unfavorable domestic and international political slant towards their war effort. In his argument, the US's tactical and technological superiority over the NVA was by no means overwhelming.

Firstly, Griffith argues that the US did not succeed as they thought that they would in the area of surveillance. Surveillance is of paramount importance when faced with an enemy based on guerrilla tactics. The physical constraints of the environment gave strength to the NVA's already elusive nature due to the denseness of the jungle and the cloak of the nights. Chemical defoliation and large scale land clearing helped but did little to improve the overall situation. Aerial surveillance also failed to penetrate the canopy. The unmanned sensors of the Mcnamara wall seemed to deliver the promise of penetrating the canopy and saving manpower. However, maintainence of the unmanned sensors and the need for follow-up action meant that it was only an auxillary and never a subsitute for the soldier on the ground. Proponents for the wall talk of the success of FSB Crook and its success with its sensors but similarly impressive kill-rates were also accomplished by FSBs with no sensors.

Next, Giffith turns to examine the lethality of US forces in mobile warfare with the enemy. General Westmoreland in late 1965 put forth the doctrine of "Search and Destroy" in order to capture the initiative in the war effort. But the problem was that the enemy was near impossible to locate before he sprang an ambush. Preparatory fire was thus used in order to flush out any NVA before US forces landed anywhere and also to boost US force morale. However, this was counterproductive as it signaled their arrival and the NVA knew when to hide and where to later attack. As a rule of thumb, US forces thus still found themselves ambushed by the NVA who had good fire discipline and would pin down the US forces with their initial initiative. The US forces would then reply by slowly escalating the level of their return fire (small arms to MG to mortar to Artillery/ Air strikes) Popular media protrays this escalation of firepower as utterly devastating on the NVA. Griffith argues otherwise. Firstly, fire orders were not accurate given that the fog of war was given a boost by the dense jungles. Artillery fire would then suffer from hesitance and/ or inaccuracy. Also the NVA would smartly close in with the US forces thus only their extended flank and rear columns (if any) would be vulnerable to US supporting arms fire as they would not risk hitting their own. Mortars also needed clearings and these were hard to find in the jungles. Heliborne support fire suffered from low aerial visibility. If the US forces threw smoke signals, the NVA would follow suit so as to confuse the pilots. Also, heli-borne support fire suffered from the inherent technical need for helicopters' high maintenance hours (thus there would often be too little and too few). Fixed wing support fire carried bigger payloads and thus needed larger safer ranges and so they mostly served as interdiction and/or counter-battery work.

Griffith then moves on to debunk the myth of the next chain in the alleged US tactical and technological superiority chain: its mobility. Or rather, air mobility as was the case in the Vietnam war. Air mobility rested on the sturdy backs of the helicopters. However, heli-borne operations suffered from many constraints. Helicopters needed LZs and the jungle terrain made their options scarce. LZs had to be cleared laboriously and maintained. LZs also needed to be "cold" lest helicopters would be lost to NVA sniping fire. Thus security was another issue. Heli-borne troops in dense jungles also tended to be lightly armed and their much vaunted mobility reverted back to foot mobility once they landed. Of course, they still had immense advantages of speed over their foot-slogging predecessors but their mobile advantage must not be exaggerated. LZs tended to be out of operation areas since they would be too "hot". This also meant that when casualties needed to be evacuated, US troops would have to fight their way out of sticky encirclement situations in order to reach their LZs in a mad-scramble to disengage.

Fourthly in a connected line of thought, Griffith then goes on to contemplate the extra-tactical dimension that the political necessity of evacuating their wounded placed limitations on US mobility. Many operations were virtually halted as it became necessary to secure the evacuation of casualties. Real time effort and attention which could have been used to pursue the NVA would then be needed to pull them back to the LZs.

Thus because of these reasons, he surmises that the US forces often did not "fire and manoeuvre" but instead the US infanrty simply found the NVA and then "manoeuvre and fire". They puckered down, made an all-round defence, ordered for supporting arms, sat tight, fought desperately out to evacuate their wounded and did not pursue the NVA. Thus the NVA were seldom decisively beat in mainforce war and this protracted the conflict.

11. On War- The myth of Nuclear Deterrence

In this lecture, Wilson Ward debunks the myth that the dropping of the Atomic bombs were the main reason that Imperial Japan surrendered. He argues that in fact it served as a convenient political face-saver. He also argues why in the modern era, the continued proliferation of Nuclear weaponary makes world security even more tenuous.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BFyfK43mEk

Follow the link above to the video lecture.

10. On War: Expansion on "Why men fight?"

Azar Gat's "War in Human Civilisation" has expanded some of my prior thoughts about the "resource" explanation for why man fight. This considerations were absent from my previous conceptualizations because of my lack of knowledge in this particular econo-environmental sphere. Resources can cause conflicts by virtue of them being resources. How so? This post will explain how.

Azar Gat expands my thoughts about the topic that low-yield environments simply requires larger territories for subsistence, Nor does wide spacing out mean that there are empty spaces to move to. As a rule, species quickly fill up their particular habitat and soon push against its boundaries.

Even in lush environments, the classical Rousseauite anthropological imagination is not valid since simple hunter-gatherers are in fact restricted nomads or centrally based wanderers. These territories were sanctioned by totem and myth and trespassers would provoke severe aggression.

In addition, "plenty of resources" is only relative. The more resource rich a region, the more people it attracts from outside, and the more internal population growth will take place. Thus a new equilibrium will eventually be reached and recreating the same tenuous ratio of subsistence.

Human needs can also be overtaken by human desire. (as I previously pointed out under perceived importance of resources)Human competition then increases with abundance and deficiency. With abundance, some monopolize access to resources and others try to upset this pattern of allocation. Also, ostentatious consumption comes into play with decorative items which are possessed and coveted for prestige purposes. These would come in the form of crafted scarce resources. Such monopolies and social positions would add onto the ability of such "Big Men" to have future access to resources.

9. On War: Revolution (Hannah Arendt) and its recourse to freedom

I am sidetracking a bit and exploring one particular form of war: a revolutionary war and starting off with understanding it in its political context. With Arendt's book, we have an insight into two revolutions: the American and French and explore the factors that led to its different outcomes. For now from hindsight, we have come to understand revolution as an action (which may constitute war) to freedom. But Arendt breaks down our lens of presentism and she starts off with the exploration of the term. The term "revolution" dates back to Machiavelli but it meant originally restoration. In the initial stags of both American and French revolution, firmly convinced that they could do no more than restore an old order that had been violated and disturbed. They merely wanted to revolve back to old times. The metaphoric use of it in political language also carried with it the notion of irresistibility and it being removed from all human influence. In addition, Hegel's historical processes convinced all who followed in the revolutionary footsteps of the French revolution that they were agents of history and historical necessity

She then moves on the social question and states that poverty was almost absent from American scene, the poor in America were laborious but not miserable. Darkness rather than want is the curse of poverty. French liberation from tyranny meant freedom for few if most were still loaded down by their misery. They had to be liberated once more from the yoke of necessity. And in comes compassion which abolishes the distance because it is easier to suffer than to see others suffer. With it, they claimed for swift and direct action, action with the means of violence. But solidarity was aroused by suffering but not guided by it. It is guided by and committed to ideas and translates into an emotion-laden insensitivity to reality. When pity is taken as the spring of virtue, holds a greater capacity for cruelty than cruelty itself. The action of violence may appear irresistible because it lives from the necessity of biological life itself thus the rebellions of the belly are the worst. Arendt points out that the direction of American revolution remained committed to foundation of freedom and establishment of lasting institutions since there was no sufferings around them to lead them astray from reason.

Another point was that the men of French revolution used freedom in novel way which could exist only in public, away from free will and thought. All except the ruling class suffered from obscurity because the public realm was invisible to them and they lacked the public space where they themselves could become visible. Tyranny then became understood as the form of government in which the ruler ruled out of his own will and in pursuit of his own interests, thus monopolized for himself the right of action in public realm (even though he may rule for their good and according to laws)

The two revolutions were also influenced by the type of power they overthrew. The Americans separated powers because only power can arrest power. To do this, they needed to create more power, an entirely new power center and they followed the model of limited monarchy that they overthrew, never even tempted to derive law and power from the same source. Power from the people but law from the constitution. Now what about the source of law? From the constitution, “we hold these truths to be self-evident” which meant that agreement between those who have embarked upon revolution was pre-rational. It informed reason but was not its product. Thus the source of law was not held by the American but they were held by this divinely informed reason. However, the overthrow of French absolutism meant that they had to find an absolute from which to derive authority for law and power and they could not find it in religion anymore. Both power and law in the French model was anchored in the will of the nation which was above and outside all government and law. This led it to be easily manipulated by someone willing to take the burden upon himself and majority decision degenerated in majority rule where the minority was pushed out.

The American revolution was also born of promises. The American revolutionists realized that whatever men may be in their singularity (good or evil) could bind themselves into a community and this need not necessarily reflect the sinful side of men. For them, binding and combining were the means by men join together for the purpose of action and is by which power is kept in existence and this was done from the start prior to the revolution. Thus in the American model, we witnessed force (through binding and combining) and power (kept in existence and binding and combining and kept in check by separating power) but in the French, we witnessed violence and power (both of which were born out of violence and seated in the will of the nation which was above and beyond the body politic and in nature, could not be kept in check).

8. On War- "Aiya! Singapore just kena one Atomic bomb, all die already. What is the point of defending?"

*Briefly translated- Singapore is of such a small landmass that if we were to suffer an attack from an atomic/ nuclear weapon, we would definitely all be wiped out. Thus what is the point of defending Singapore at all?*

If you are a Singaporean adult like me, I am sure that you have been hearing kids of all ages from the years when we were young till now who state this claim. And if you are like me, you would no doubt feel the intellectual exasperation. And if you are an adult but do not see any problem with the above exclamation, please take a seat with the children while I shall once and for all put this claim to rest.

In this post, I shall argue the case of "Theory meets Reality" on the various claims of the statement above.

Firstly,Singapore is of such a small landmass and concentrated density that if we were to suffer an attack from an atomic/ nuclear weapon, we would definitely be all wiped out. Yes, this is a definite. Most if not all of us would be wiped out. Why? The terror of atomic/ nuclear weapons inflict direct damage through static, dynamic overpressure and thermal radiation which on impact with a human body would cause severe burning, hemorrhaging or air embolisms, either of which can be rapidly fatal.

The indirect effect of such weapons would be a nuclear fallout. This is because when added to the dust of radioactive material released by the bomb itself, a large amount of radioactive material is released into the environment. This form of radioactive contamination poses the primary risk of exposure to ionizing radiation for a large nuclear weapon. This radioactive dust, consisting of hot particles, is a kind of radioactive contamination. It can lead to the contamination of the animal food chain. Rapid death following high doses of penetrating whole-body radiation, to essentially normal lives for a variable period of time until the development of delayed radiation effects, in a portion of the exposed population, following low dose exposures. Late or delayed effects of radiation occur following a wide range of doses and dose rates. Delayed effects may appear months to years after irradiation and include a wide variety of effects involving almost all tissues or organs. Some of the possible delayed consequences of radiation injury are life shortening, carcinogenesis, cataract formation, chronic radiodermatitis, decreased fertility, and genetic mutations.

So yes in theory, if we were to suffer from an attack by such weapons, we would surely "all die already". But theory has to meet reality which is the hallmark of all sound argumentative statements.

What does it mean to possess a nuclear weapon? What does it cost? Let's explore the physical costs first. These would include the costs of research and development, fabrication, production and the infrastructure required for the launching/ deployment of these weapons. These costs come in the amounts of trillions. This realistically cuts down the amount of countries and individuals who are able to deploy such weapons.

Next and perhaps of more gravity are the political costs of even possessing such weapons. The political status of being a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) is high indeed. The first group of countries who are pushing up the entry of barrier so as to speak are the NWS already present who have every incentive to keep their club limited in size so as to keep the international Balance of Power in their favor. When a state acquires nuclear weapons ability, the cost of invading that state then tactically increases, since it becomes more difficult and expensive for the aggressor to gain a military edge. Then there are NWS supported multilateral pressures exerted by the likes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which seek to keep the BOP just the way it is. So any state who wished to acquire NWS status would have to run up against the big boys. And current US foreign policy, along with its allies and other powerful nuclear-armed states, have worked to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, while also attempting to coax rival NWS into decommissioning their nuclear weapons. And most importantly, US has been careful to leave some of its important allies with nuclear weapons in order to preserve the BOP in certain regions like Israel in the Middle East.

In this third section of this counter-argument, we must consider the possibility if a state would use atomic/ nuclear weapons against Singapore in the first place. The true value of such weapons lie in its deterrence and bargaining power. This is because the fear of reprisals from using such a morally objectionable weapon in this current world order would bear into the mental calculations of aggressors. We all are well-associated with the chilling end-game scenario that was the fear of all parties involved in the Cold War, "MAD" or Mutually-Assured Destruction.

Lastly we consider if Singapore even warrants an attack from such weapons. We are not tactically costly to defeat if we were to come face to face with a NWS who would logically have better military capabilities than us. So we would not be in the same situation as Japan in WW2 who doggedly refused to surrender and would cost the US millions of lives if US chose to launch a landed invasion. Secondly, Singapore would have to commit a seriously heinous international atrocity to warrant the use of such punitive and morally objectionable weapons on us. Thirdly, would we be even worth the attention and all the physical and political costs incurred to level such weapons against us? Fourthly and consider this: even if we were still in the age of conquest, occupation and harvesting of resources, Singapore is essentially an information exchange and trade hub and such "resources" would not be able to exploited by an aggressor who uses such weapons and obliterates all people and infrastructure in the act.